A ‘no-deal’ Brexit "would be a failure of the UK political system and it could produce chaos, at least in the short-term," according to British academic Kevin Featherstone, an Eleftherios Venizelos Professor in Contemporary Greek Studies and Professor in European Politics at the London School of Economics and Politics (LSE). 
Talking to the Athens-Macedonian News Agency in an interview released on Sunday, ahead of his visit to Greece for the 4th Delphi Economic Forum (Feb. 28 - March 3), Featherstone said he was unable to believe that the UK would "leave the EU with literally no arrangements in place" and also expressed fears that a hard Brexit could push the UK economy into recession.
He described Brexit as a symptom of a "a new populism" that was not purely British but also had "wider manifestations like Trump, Marine Le Pen, AfD or Salvini", and which he blamed on social exclusion and "the lack of a political voice" and talked about the significance of Brexit for the UK, Europe and Greece, as well as the LSE's Hellenic Observatory, of which he is director.
In the intervew, he also talked about the upcoming European elections and the main challenges facing Europe, which he said has to "reconnect" with voters and the lives of ordinary people.

The full interview with Prof. Featherstone is given below:

ANA: What does a no-deal Brexit mean for Great Britain and the EU?
A ‘no-deal’ outcome would be a failure of the UK political system and it could produce chaos, at least in the short-term.  I cannot believe that the UK would leave the EU with literally no arrangements in place for the day after: planes still need to fly, ships to enter ports, data to be exchanged, etc.  To argue that ‘no-deal’ could create rapid new and positive opportunities for the UK is illusory and ignores what business is saying, as well as the vast majority of economists.  To say that it might produce long-term benefits sacrifices the well-being of the most vulnerable in our society in the short-medium term.  For the EU, BREXIT is a distraction and a drain on its morale.  With different kinds of Euroscepticism across Europe, it is too optimistic to believe that without the UK, the EU27 will suddenly agree to create a United States of Europe or something similar.  The risk is that the EU27 will become more introspective and less confident.

ANA:What do you think will be the main consequences for Greece? 
It’s a matter of damage limitation.  You cannot ask for a divorce and say this is because we want to move closer together.  BREXIT means the UK is privileging the opportunity for closer ties with non-European nations than with EU members and the calculation that this might produce bigger gains is not based on any hard evidence.  
Anglo-Hellenic trade in goods is minimal, so whether the UK has a customs union with the EU or no deal, the domestic economic effect in Greece will be trivial.  More significant will be whether the UK and the EU secure a deal covering services.  This can impact on shipping, tourism and access to the City of London’s financial services.

ANA: Will it affect the operation of the Hellenic Observatory at LSE?
Not in any obvious way.  Having studied the near-lunacy of 2015 in Greece, the lens can be reversed and the UK may be regarded as an exotic and irrational case, a point of contrast for those who overcame their mental breakdown.

ANA:A few years ago the debate on GREXIT dominated the news. Today we are one step away from Brexit. Greece and Great Britain have parallel lives for in opposite directions or is this just coincidence caused by intersecting events?

Both cases displayed an orgy of populism, with unrealizable demands.  This is not just coincidence: voters were sold dreams and lies.  They were also told to suspend their rational beliefs and ignore the experts.  Other countries would follow in support; Germany would compromise in the end.  All of this proved wrong.  Varoufakis’ strategy cost Greece billions; a hard BREXIT may well push the UK economy into recession.  

ANA: In recent years there has been an increase in ultra-conservative rhetoric in European politics. How much do you think this may have influenced the Brexit process? 

BREXIT is a symptom of a cause that is not purely British; it has wider manifestations like Trump, Marine Le Pen, AfD or Salvini.  This is a new populism.  It has roots in a sense of social exclusion and a lack of political voice.  A colleague spoke at a public meeting and warned of the loss of GDP from BREXIT: a man at the back of the hall shouted ‘That’s your GDP, it’s not mine’.  Increasing poverty in recent years has meant that more and more voters can’t identify with a Europe that doesn’t work for them.

ANA: How will it affect the forthcoming European elections?

Elections to the European Parliament are often protest votes: governments do badly and voters take the opportunity to show their dissatisfaction.  This year we might see a European Parliament with a large minority of populists and a variety of eurosceptics.  This wasn’t supposed to happen: the Parliament was to help create Europe, not destroy it.  These voices will fall well-short of a majority, but they nevertheless tarnish the image of the EU project, creating division.  This can only be disruptive to the sense of a common purpose.

ANA: Which type of government model, do you think is better able to respond to today’s challenges? Cooperation governments or one-party governments?

It’s probably more a matter of the political space commanded by a government: it needs to be unifying of public opinion, without being all-embracing - leaving the AfD as the opposition is dangerous for the German coalition.

ANA: Greece has completed the process of economic adjustment. What are the current stakes?

Greece has made impressive fiscal adjustments.  But Europe has shackled it with draconian limits on future government spending.  Governments will lack autonomy of choice for many years to come.  Parties cannot promise good times or major benefits.  In recent years Greece has failed to implement important structural reforms.  The economy lacks competitiveness.  This is a path of lost potential, hope foregone.  The political system has failed Greece.  The country needs to own its future, to take the tough decisions and agree a long-term plan of economic reform.  That means turning away from the short-termism of the past and talking a language of priorities and reallocation of scarce resources.

ANA: What do you think will be the main challenges for the European venture over the next 10 years and which institutional changes should it make?

The main challenge is to reconnect with voters: to enable them to see how Europe addresses their needs, how it is part of the solution not the problem.  Past generations saw Europe as delivering jobs and prosperity, delivering a new peace, etc.  Today, the EU seems too distant from the lives of ordinary people.  We have to connect ‘Europe’ with the big issues of the future and show that it offers better solutions.  A key part of this will be whether Europe has more effective and committed national leaders.  ‘Europe’ needs to be re-sold at home.

ANA: Can the EU become more democratic, and if so, how? Is it possible to achieve economic convergence and social cohesion?

In the medium term, I think it’s difficult for Europe to overcome its so-called ‘democratic deficit’.  More institutional changes in Brussels will just seem too distant from the lives and concerns of ordinary people.  First, Europe must deliver - jobs, security, better environmental regimes, etc - so people see the benefits.  You’re absolutely correct: growth, economic convergence must come in parallel to a much greater priority to social inclusion.  An Ordo-liberal Europe seems cold and unresponsive; Germany balances it at home with the compensations of its ‘social market economy’.  Europe needs a similar balance.  Otherwise, we create a Europe that excludes, increases social pain.  There are good ideas around: like creating a common European insurance scheme for the unemployed.  Such a scheme would make a difference - helping Europe to be more inclusive, less distant.